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Abstract
This thesis is focused on the issues and challenges confronted by real network
topologies. The goal of this thesis is to lead towards tools that permit network
design to be as resilient as possible. In this thesis, a new capability has been
introduced for the ns-3 simulator in which challenges such as failures, attacks,
and natural disasters can be applied to different networks. Several simulations
were performed to study the network resilience in the face of different challenges.
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4.7 GÉANT2 Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.8 Ray Casting Algorithm Example (Even) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.9 Ray Casting Algorithm Example (Odd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
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This chapter focuses on the motivation behind this thesis and what eventually
led to the idea of resilient networks. The motivation for this thesis leads to a
problem statement that helps define the goals and objectives to be achieved by
developing a challenge simulator to evaluate network resilience.
This chapter is organized as follows: First the existing situation of communica-
tion systems and the threats faced by them are described to outline the motivation
behind this thesis. Second, the problem statement is clearly defined. Third, the
goals and objectives for the simulator are stated. Finally, the contributions of this
thesis are introduced.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Today we have an increasing reliance on computer networks and specifically
the Global Internetwork. With emerging technologies, new applications and usage
scenarios drive increased reliance on network services and infrastructure. This
increasing reliance means that disruptions have a greater impact on society and
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hence increasing attractiveness for those that want to harm society.
Furthermore, these networks are affected by natural disasters and human mis-
configurations that are unintentionally induced in the networks. Natural disasters
are inevitable whereas it is unrealistic to assure that human mistakes will not oc-
cur. In the event of an adversity leading to breakdown of the network, parts of
the world can become isolated, reducing the utility of the network and its services.
These severe consequences of disruption motivate the need for resilience to attack.
Survivability of the network against adverse conditions is an essential aspect of
dependable communications. Incorporating network resilience to threats and un-
derstanding the influence of challenges on network operation and performance is
one of the key aspects of this thesis.
This thesis aims to provide tools that enhance resiliency and survivability of
the network. “Resilience is the ability of the network to provide and maintain
an adequate level of service in the face of challenges to normal operation”, [34]
whereas “survivability is the capability of a system to fulfill its operation, in a
timely manner, in the presence of threats such as attacks or large-scale natural
disasters. Survivability is a subset of resilience”. [34]
1.2 Problem Statement
All communication networks are exposed to challenges such as natural disas-
ters, attacks, or human mistakes. Therefore, the need arises to build communi-
cation networks that are resilient to such challenges. To analyse the behavior of
existing and proposed networks under different scenarios, we need a framework
that will simulate these challenges and the corresponding effects of the network
under the induced challenge.
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1.3 Goals and Objectives
The objective of this thesis is to design a framework that is capable of generat-
ing a challenge model, such as a natural disaster, that can be applied to a network
model. The models are based on the user specifications, with challenge generation
isolated from the type of network. Hence, any challenge can be imposed onto any
network to observe its performance.
1.4 Contributions
This thesis provides a new tool that permits the separartion of challenge spec-
ification from the network model, so that resilience can be simulated without
modification of the network model for each challenge. Furthermore this thesis
demonstrates the utility of this technique by evaluating the resilience of several
network topologies under several challenges.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview
of the past research done that is the basis for the work done for this thesis. This
begins with an overview of network simulators that can be used to simulate various
real world scenarios. Resilience to challenges against the network is discussed with
respect to various past research. Several existing topologies and topology genera-
tion tools are also discussed. Chapter 3 describes the diverse challenges that are
confronted by the networks. Furthermore, the various aspects of resilience are in-
troduced including different properties, attributes, and importance to understand
the objective of this thesis. Chapter 4 discusses simulation implementation tech-
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niques and describes the assumptions and abstractions along with the algorithms
that were employed for the challenge simulation. Chapter 5 discusses the different
simulation parameters that were essential to the testing of the simulator. Then
simulation runs are described and analysed that produce several results to justify
and hence prove the concept. Chapter 6 finalises the thesis with some conclusions
and suggestions for future work .
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter focuses on the different network simulation tools available for
research along with a few examples of related work on resilience and survivability
of the networks. After describing the functionalities of different simulators, the
rationale of using ns-3 for this thesis is presented.
This chapter is organised as follows: First, several network simulators are
discussed with special emphasis on the capabilities of each simulator relevant to
the requirements of this thesis. Second, various network topology generation tools
are discussed along with the way they differentiate from one another. Finally, some
other related work is discussed.
2.1 Introduction to Network Simulators
To effectively engineer the Internet, proper understanding of its underlying
structure is very important. Complete knowledge of the underlying structure
is not possible due to its complexity and proprietary service provider topolo-
gies, therefore accurately mapping of its structure and evolution is not practical.
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Hence for experimental and research purposes, some network simulators synthesise
topologies that reflect many aspects of the actual Internet topology.
2.1.1 Network Simulators
Network simulators are frequently used for research into new protocols and
architectures. Some of the important network simulators include the Optimized
Network Engineering Tools (OPNET) Modeler, Global Mobile Information Sys-
tem Simulator (GloMoSim), Network Simulator 2 (ns-2), and Network Simulator
3 (ns-3).
2.1.2 OPNET Modeler Function and Capabilities
OPNET [21] Modeler is a commercial modelling and simulation tool that helps
in designing and analysing communication networks. OPNET is a discrete event
simulator with a user friendly graphical user interface (GUI). To aid research
and development work in the field of communications, OPNET makes use of a
wide variety of ready-to-use models, protocols, and technologies. Furthermore,
OPNET also facilitates the design of custom models. This permits the user to
either customise the existing models according to the requirements of the network
or design completely new models.
Although OPNET is a very powerful simulation tool, a major drawback is its
complexity. Customising and developing new models is not an easy task. Thor-
ough understanding of the source code used in designing the models is required.
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2.1.3 GloMoSim Function and Capabilities
GloMoSim [17] is a scalable simulation environment intended for wireless net-
works. The design of the simulator includes a parallel discrete-event simulation
capability, and is built using a layered approach with standard APIs between
the model layers. This helps to integrate models designed by different people.
A visualisation capability is also present to see where and when the packets are
being transferred, dropped, or rerouted. The platform used for designing models
is Parsec [5], of which some knowledge is esstential. Parsec is a C-based simu-
lation language developed for sequential and parallel execution of discrete event
simulation models.
In spite of all its advantages, a major drawback of GloMoSim is the lack of a
simulation environment for the wired networks. The capabilty for designing wired
as well as hybrid wired-wireless networks is not available and hence the use of
GloMoSim for this thesis was not possible.
2.1.4 Ns-2 Function and Capabilities
Ns-2 [19] is a network simulator that uses OTcl [16] as a command and configu-
ration interface. OTcl is an object oriented version of Tcl. Ns-2 is an open source
simulation tool and hence widely used by the academic and research commu-
nity. There are quite a few important features and models present in ns-2, which
include RED queue management, dynamic routing, multipath routing, two-way
TCP, scheduling algorithms, and support for mobile hosts [19]. Furthermore, the
output of simulations is readily available for observation via nam, the network
animator [13]. This helps to actually visualise the flow of each packet within the
network and hence understand the whole process.
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Although these models are essential to any simulator, there are quite a few
deficiencies in ns-2. Originally, ns-2 began with only wired network simulation
functionality. Later, with the increasing need for simulating the wireless networks,
wireless capabilities were added [1]. However, this is a different set of models that
do not interoperate with wired models, so hybrid simulations are not possible. For
every new release of ns-2, simulation models may have to be designed again as each
simulation is tied to a particular release that makes ns-2 very fragile to changes.
Furthermore, ns-2 is evolving rapidly to include new functionalities, models, and
protocols, but unfortunately the proper documentation frequently does not keep
pace.
2.1.5 Ns-3 Function and Capabilities
Ns-3 [20] is a completely new open-source, discrete-event simulator recently
designed for the academic and research communities. As compared to ns-2, the
distinguishing feature is a different configuration interface and set of scripts. Al-
though the ns-3 simulator is written in C++ as is ns-2, the command and config-
uration interfaces are different. Ns-3 models are written only in C++ with some
optional Python scripting. Hance, the scripts are not backward compatible and
ns-3 is not an extension of ns-2. This permits a new modular design of network
simulation models that can incorporate many more functionalities that were not
present in ns-2.
Ns-3 contains inherent support for hybrid networks in which the type of each
link, wired or wireless, can be specified. To observe and study the results from
ns-3 simulations, pcap packet trace files are generated after the scripts are run;
interpreting these files helps us to analyze the network’s behavior. Ns-3 suffers
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from a lack of models due to its recent development. If, on one hand, ns-3 lacks
predefined models, on the other hand there are new functionalities important for
this thesis.
There are certain generalisations used in ns-3. The basic computing device
in ns-3 is represented by the Node class that provides methods for managing
the devices in simulations. The user program is represented by the Application
class that provides methods for managing the user-level applications in simula-
tions. Nodes are connected to the network via the communication channel. The
channel is represented by the Channel class that manages communication ob-
jects and connects them to nodes. All of the network devices and their respective
software drivers, collectively called netdevices, are used to connect the computers
to the network and are represented by the NetDevice class. This covers both the
software driver and the simulated hardware part. The NetDevice class provides
methods to manage connections to Node and Channel objects. Finally, to attach
Nodes to NetDevices, Channels to NetDevices, and to assign the IP addresses,
topology helpers are present. The topology helper creates NetDevices, adds MAC
addresses, installs the NetDevice on the Node, configures the protocol stack on the
node, and connects the NetDevice to a Channel, hence making the configuration
setup easier. The modular structure of the ns-3 simulator makes it possible to
easily deploy and analyse the network behaviors.
2.2 Network Topology Generation
To effectively engineer and evolve the Internet, a detailed understanding of its
underlying structure is necessary. Mapping its actual topology is unfortunately a
difficult task. However, topology generation tools have attempted to model the
9
modern Internet as a way to understand its behavior.
There are a wide variety of topology generation tools available that vary con-
siderably in the way they synthesise the network.
2.2.1 Waxman
Waxman [35, 36] was among the first to develop an algorithm for the random
generation of network topologies. The Waxman topology generator is a geograph-
ical model depicting the growth of the network. In this model, the nodes are
uniformly distributed and are connected with one another based on a probability
that is related to the distance between the respective nodes.
2.2.2 GT-ITM
The GT-ITM [18] topology generator attempts to reproduce the hierarchical
structure of the Internet topology. It is a collection of software tools for creation,
manipulation, and analysis of graph models of the topologies. It also includes
enhanced visualisation capabilities, a routing and forwarding module for use with
large graphs, and support for modeling of interdomain routing policies.
2.2.3 BRITE
BRITE [29] is a universal topology generation tool designed to be flexible to
operate and user friendly. This tool is extensible; the functionalities can be further
enhanced.
A distinguishing feature is that brite supports both flat and hierarchical
topologies. Furthermore, it allows interoperability between topologies from other
topology generators. brite models can be assigned link attributes such as band-
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width and delay. It also allows the user to provide custom configurations for the
topology.
2.2.4 KU-LoCGen
The University of Kansas location and cost constrained network topology gen-
erator (KU-LocGen) [28] is a tool to enable geographic node positioning and the
respective cost constraints on the topologies generated by well-known graph gen-
eration algorithms. These two features greatly enhance the utility of the existing
topology generators.
Most of the topology generators focus upon the generation of interconnecting
links between the nodes irrespective of the node position. Nodes are generally
placed in a random fashion that does not depict real-world scenarios. This is
important as network designers are generally constrained by the position of the
nodes.
Capital constraints are a significant limiting factor in network deployment.
KU-LoCGen uses a realistic cost function to determine a range of affordable model
parameters that provide feasible topologies that optimise the performance under
cost constraints.
These two features prove to be quite important for this thesis. Using the node
positioning facility, the real networks under consideration can be accurately and
precisely positioned, whereas the cost constraints dictate the link structure of a
network. KU-LoCGen creates different topologies which include purely random,
locality based, and Waxman models. The topologies used for this thesis were
those generated using the Waxman model.
KU-LoCGen incorporates network design practices in topology generation,
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thereby enabling a tool that can be used to generate and analyse viable alter-
nate topologies during the network design and engineering phase.
2.3 Other Related Work
Geol, Belardo and Iwan proposed a self-healing and self-managing network [27],
the purpose of which was to provide uninterrupted communication between gov-
ernment agencies when part or all of the network goes down because of any mishap
or crisis. They took the motivation from the drawbacks of the communications
network which became evident after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Cen-
ter. The architecture proposes independent services with standard interfaces and
variable addresses. Under any sort of a challenge, the services that are affected
are segregated from the network and the redundant, independent services replace
them at alternate nodes. The redundant services discover each other by matching
the standard interfaces and allow even the complex operations to be performed
through them. Furthermore, these new services add to the redundancy of the
network at times of network overload. This means the new services will not allow
the performance of the network to degrade due to traffic overload.
Xiangqian, Makki, Kang, and Pissinou proposed Adapting Traffic Evolution
Topology gEnerators (ATETEs) which provide three types of network backbone
evolution methods [24]. This corresponds to topology generation but under stressed
network conditions. The need for network backbone evolution arises when the
traffic through the network increases and exceeds the capacity of the network in-
frastructure. The three main types of evolution methods proposed include link
upgrading, node upgrading, and their combination. In the link upgrading scenario,
link capacity is increased whereas in the node upgrading scenario, more nodes and
12
links of the same link capacity are added. ATETEs consider traffic distribution
and select the congested link as the main shunting object. Compared with most
of other topology generators such as BRITE that do not consider traffic, ATETEs




This chapter focuses on resilience and survivability of networks, along with
different challenges faced by the communication networks.
This chapter is organized as follows: First, several resiliency traits and strate-
gies are discussed. Second, different kinds of challenges that impair the normal
working behavior of the networks are categorized and their respective effects are
classified. Finally, an introduction is provided to the way in which challenges are
modeled for this thesis.
3.1 Resilience
“Resilience is the ability of the network to provide and maintain an acceptable
level of service in the face of various faults and challenges to normal operation” [8].
A resilient network detects, remediates, and recovers from outages and periods of
degraded performance within as little time as possible. This so happens that
each node in the network continuously monitors the functioning and quality of
the associated paths. The information hence gathered is analysed by the node
14
itself. Based on the condition of the paths, the nodes decide the best suited path
to route the packets. This whole process aims to enhance the overall resilience of
the network.
The diagram in Figure 3.1 shows the characteristics that make a system re-
silient.
Figure 3.1. Resilience Overview
3.1.1 Tolerance
The first major aspect of resilience is tolerance. “Tolerance refers to the ability
of the communications network system to endure service failures”. It is known
from experience that failures are inevitable, in part because it is not possible
to design a perfect system. There are several important aspects of tolerance,
15
described in the following subsections.
3.1.1.1 Fault tolerance
“Fault tolerance is the ability of a system to tolerate faults such that service
failures do not result”. Faults can be treated as random and independent events;
either single or very few in number [4, 22]. Generally, systems are made fault
tolerant by eliminating every known failure and by providing redundancy to permit
continued operation even when failures do occur. In this thesis, fault tolerance
with link redundancy is employed as the basis for analysis of resilience.
3.1.1.2 Survivability
“Survivability is the capability of a system to fulfil its mission, in a timely
manner, in the presence of threats such as targetted attacks or large-scale nat-
ural disasters resulting in many failures, in addition to the few random failures
covered by fault tolerance” [11, 25]. In other words, it refers to the ability of the
communications network system to operate as intended, even if the challenges are
considerably more severe than independent random failures. This thesis works on
the principle of survivability, particularly when the network is under attack or is
impaired because of some operational or component failure.
3.1.1.3 Disruption tolerance
“Disruption tolerance is the ability of a system to tolerate disruptions in con-
nectivity among its components” [3,26]. It covers disruptions from environmental
challenges including weak and episodic channel connectivity, mobility, and delay.
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3.1.1.4 Traffic tolerance
“Traffic tolerance is the ability of a system to tolerate unpredictable offered
load without a significant drop in carried load (including congestion collapse), as
well as to isolate the effects from cross traffic, other flows, and other nodes” [15].
The traffic can either be unexpected but legitimate such as from a flash crowd, or
malicious such as a DDoS attack. Traffic patterns usually vary and most of the
times they are unpredictable.
3.1.2 Trustworthiness
The second major aspect of resilience refers to properties of dependability,
security, and performability that can be measured to analyse how the nature
responds to challenges. “Trustworthiness relates to something which is worthy of
being trusted to satisfy its specified requirements, in the presence of a wide range
of adversities” [30]. There are a number of aspects of trustworthiness, described
in the following subsections.
3.1.2.1 Dependability
“Dependability is the property of a system such that reliance can justifiably
be placed on the service it delivers” [2]. It generally includes the measures of
availability (ability to use a system or service) and reliability (continuous operation
of a system or service), as well as integrity, maintainability, and safety [23].
3.1.2.2 Security
“Security is the property of a system and measures taken such that a net-
work is capable of protecting itself from unauthorised access or change, subject
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to policy” [10]. Security can be broadly thought of as encompassing everything
that promotes the prevention, detection, and remediation of deleterious system
behavior which includes actions of people, information technology, and physical
environments [30]. Typical properties include AAA (auditability, authorisability,
authenticity), confidentiality, and nonrepudiality. Security shares with depend-
ability the properties of availability and integrity.
3.1.2.3 Performability
“Performability is the property of a system such that it delivers performance
required by the service specification, as described by QoS (quality of service)
measures” [6]. The goal is for systems to provide continued performance even
when challenged. Although the performance level declines, the system is still
functional and provides logically correct operation. This is made possible in part
by the use of redundant components to permit the system run [7]. In this thesis,
when a certain failure occurs in the network, the nodes recalculte to figure out
a way to route the packets through some other paths to provide performability.
Performability in terms of goodput and packet delivery ratio is the measure of
resilience used in this thesis.
3.2 Challenges
A challenge can be defined as an adverse event or condition that impacts the
normal operation. Different challenges cause different type of errors, some of
which are discussed below.
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3.2.1 Flash Crowds and Denial of Service Attacks
Flash events and denial of service are the two common challenges. Both of
these overwhelm the network resources to a point that either the services are
degraded or completely fail.
A flash crowd is a huge surge in legitimate traffic to a single point such as a
web server causing a significant increase in the network load resulting in packet
loss and congestion.
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are malicious challenges that saturate network
resources so that the services cannot be provided to the intended users. When a
network is under a DoS attack, an attempt can be made to distinguish and isolate
the malicious traffic.
3.2.2 Challenges in Wireless Networks
Mobile wireless networks face disruptions from a number of factors. A major
source of disruption is mobility of network nodes. Routes change due to move-
ments and often result in disconnects. Wireless channels are generally noisy, weak,
and asymmetric. Furthermore, there may be unpredictably long delays either due
to long satellite links or episodic connectivity.
3.2.3 Attacks
Attacks can directly target either the software, the hardware, or the proto-
col infrastructure of the communication network in an attempt to disrupt the
communications and make the services unavailable. Attacks can be launched by
recreational crackers or terrorists.
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3.2.4 Misconfigurations
Human misconfigurations and operational errors are not uncommon. This
may include a firewall blocking legitimate traffic, a load balancer unable to use
all resources, or routing protocols announcing the wrong prefix route combination
resulting in traffic following the wrong path.
3.2.5 Natural Faults
Natural faults result from design flaws or network component aging. These
are random failures and quite inevitable.
3.3 Simulated Challenges
The different challenges simulated and hence studied for this thesis are dis-
cussed in this section.
3.3.1 Random Faults
Random failures result from component failures and non-malicious human er-
ror such as fiber cuts.
3.3.2 Natural Disasters
Natural disasters such as hurricanes are a major threat to communication
network that has geographical scope. To simulate this scenario we can define an
area A over which the challenge is applied to the network. This area can either
be an n-sided polygon (x 0 , y0), (x 1 , y1), (x n−1 , yn−1) or a circle with center
at x 0, y0 and radius r.
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3.3.3 Attacks by Intelligent Adversary
An intelligent adversary attack is characterised by the failure of components
that may impact the network the most. This is the case when an attacker has




This chapter describes the simulation environment, the simulation code, algo-
rithms, and protocols used to overcome the design problems.
This chapter is organized as follows: First an overview of the simulation envi-
ronment is provided. Second, the code implementing the challenge simulation is
explained highlighting the critical aspects. Third, an overview of the algorithms
used in the simulation code is provided. Finally, this chapter discusses the KU-
LoCGen topology generator, which is used as an input to the analysis presented
in Chapter 5.
4.1 Introduction to the Simulation Environment
Ns-3 is the simulator used for this thesis as described in section 2.1.5.
4.1.1 Abstractions and Conceptual Overview
As discussed earlier, there are certain abstractions used in ns-3. The basic
computing device abstraction represented by the Node class provides methods
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for managing the devices in simulations. The abstraction for the user program
is represented by the Application class that provides methods for managing the
user level applications in simulations. Nodes are connected to the network via
the communication channel. The channel is abstracted by the Channel class
that manages communication objects and connects nodes to them. There are spe-
cialised channels present in ns-3 that include CsmaChannel, PointToPointChan-
nel, and WiFiChannel. All of the network devices and their respective software
drivers collectively called netdevices are used to connect the computers to the net-
work and are abstracted by the NetDevice class. This covers both the software
driver and the simulated hardware. The NetDevice class provides methods to
manage connections to Node and Channel objects. Finally, to attach the Nodes
to the NetDevices, the Channels to the NetDevices, and to assign the IP addresses,
topology helpers are present. Topology helpers create NetDevice, adds MAC ad-
dress, installs the NetDevice on the Node, configures the protocol stack on the
node, and connects the NetDevice to a Channel hence making the configuration
setup easier.
Several different topology helpers are used in ns-3 topology generation. The
NodeContainer topology helper provides a convenient way to create, manage,
and access Node objects that are created in order to run a simulation. The
NetDeviceContainer helps to manage and access device objects. The PointTo-
PointHelper assists in the configurations and connections between a PointTo-
PointNetDevice to the PointToPointChannel. The InternetStackHelper installs
an Internet Stack (TCP, UDP, IP, etc.) on each of the nodes in the NodeCon-
tainer. The IPv4AddressHelper manages the allocation of IP addresses to the
device on the node, from 10.1.1.0 with netmask 255.255.255.0. By default the
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addresses allocated start at 10.1.1.1 and increase monotonically.
4.2 Simulation Code Organisation
The challenge simulator organisation takes a few inputs from the user which
include, in a broad sense, the network descriptor files and challenge descriptor
files.
Figure 4.1. Simulation Flow
The network descriptor files contain data regarding a specific network topology
whereas the challenge descriptor file contains the specifications of the challenge
to be imposed onto a network. A significant contribution of this thesis is that the
network description has been separated from the challenge description. This is to
say that any sort of a challenge can be applied to any communications network
architecture for the purpose of studying it’s resilience under attack. This reduces
the problem to c challenge descriptors and n network models rather than c × n
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combined models.
Figure 4.1 shows the overall organisation of the challenge simulation process.
4.2.1 Network Descriptors
The simulator generates the network using two different types of network spec-
ification files namely, the node coordinate matrix and adjacency matrix.
The network specification file is the node coordinate matrix file that speci-
fies the geographical location of the nodes in the form of x -coordinates and y-
coordinates as shown in Figure 4.2. The location of each node is an important
property to include in case of a geographical failure resulting from a natural dis-
aster. Nodes that fall within the region of impact are put down by the simulator.
The adjacency matrix file contains all the adjacent interconnections between
different nodes of the network and this defines the links. Figure 4.3 shows exam-
ple nodes that are interconnected and the corresponding matrix. Once the links
are established they are shown by 1’s in the matrix. Using this file the simulator
creates IPv4 associations between the nodes, which permits the simulator to de-
termine which links will be affected by a given challenge. This file also provides
the simulator with the total number of nodes in the network.
4.2.2 Network Topologies
Several network topologies are generated using KU-LoCGen, introduced in
section 2.2.4. The actual topology adjacency matrix is based on the real network
deployed by a network operator. Figure 4.4 shows the actual Sprint router-level
topology as inferred by Rocketfuel [33].
For the sake of comparison, additional topologies based on Sprint node loca-
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Figure 4.2. Example Node Coordinate Matrix
tions were generated by KU-LoCGen. The synthetic resilient topology has richer
interconnections and hence lower probability of service disruption under failures.
Figure 4.5 shows the Sprint synthetic resilient topology. Increased resilience with
more redundant links result in a significantly increased cost.
The third scenario is the synthetic fragile topology, which is less topologically
interconnectedand is therefore less resilient. Ideally a network engineer should
be able to determine the right balance between connectivity (resilience) and cost.
Figure 4.6 shows the fragile Sprint topology. Note that even a single node or link
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Figure 4.3. Adjacency Matrix
failure near the middle of the graph can partition the network.
Additionally, the European research network GÉANT2 [12] topology is studied
for comparison. Figure 4.7 shows the GÉANT2 actual topology.
4.2.3 Challenge Descriptors
Challenge description is a critical aspect of this thesis. The challenge descriptor
file provides the necessary information needed to put the network under attack
and hence observe its resilience. This thesis does not directly provide a means of
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Figure 4.4. Actual Sprint Topology
improving the resilience of the network, but rather provides tools to help study
the level of resilience for a certain network under different challenges.
This simulator design focuses on four types of challenge scenarios which include
randomly occuring failures, geographical failures, link failures, and intelligent ad-
versary attacks.
4.2.3.1 Random Failures
In case of random failures, the user provides the number of nodes which are to
be shut down as input to the simulator. Using a random number generator, the
simulator randomly selects nodes and shuts them down at the time specified in the
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Figure 4.5. Sprint Synthetic Resilient Topology
challenge descriptor file. After being shut down for a specific duration the network
regains the nodes, if and when the challenge is removed. Hence, the behavior of
the network when some operational failure occurs can be studied and the system
can be modified accordingly. In this thesis, five runs are averaged with a different
set of a given number of random nodes down.
4.2.3.2 Geographic Failures
In an area-based challenge, the user provides the area specifications in the
terms of geographic coordinates (longitude, latitude) to the simulator. The simu-
lator uses the ray casting algorithm [32] to figure out how many and which nodes
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Figure 4.6. Sprint Synthetic Fragile Topology
lie under the direct impact of the challenge and will be cut off from the rest of
the network during a geographical failure. A ray is initiated from any node in
one direction and extended untill the end of the simulation region. The number
of times this ray cuts the challenge polygon boundary is counted. If the number
of crossings is an even number, the node lies outside the affected region, as in
Figure 4.8. If, however, the number of crossings are odd, then the node lies inside
and will be shutdown, as in Figure 4.9. The simulator then shuts nodes within
the polygon down at the time specified by the user, which generally represents a
natural disaster such as a hurricane.
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Figure 4.7. GÉANT2 Topology
4.2.3.3 Link Failures
Optical fiber cable links are the most reliable and widely deployed means of
long-haul communications in the world today. Accidental fiber cuts can impact
network’s operation. The Link Cut model is be used to simulate a random cable
cut in networks.
4.2.3.4 Attack by an Intelligent Adversary
A significant threat to normal operation is an attack by an intelligent adversary
who has knowledge of the network topology. Key nodes or links may be targetted
to inflict major damage. This simulator has the ability to put down certain
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Figure 4.8. Ray Casting Algorithm Example (Even)
nodes or links to analyse network performance under targetted attacks. User can
provide a list of nodes to be shut down or a list of links that are intended to be
targetted. To better engineer the cable connections and node interconnections,
the user observes the behavior of the network once those nodes and links go down
and come up again.
4.3 Simulation Models
An ns-3 C++ object is created for each instance of the network. Each con-
nected node pair is kept in a node container that helps in managing and accessing
the respective node objects. Since this simulation code deals only with the wired
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Figure 4.9. Ray Casting Algorithm Example (Odd)
networks, nodes are fixed at a certain geographic location. Nodes are intercon-
nected via a full-duplex point-to-point link. In order to make the link full duplex,
there are two wires in the channel each of which have an idle and a transmit
state. Each link has a capacity of 5 Mb/s and imposes a 2 ms transmission delay
for each packet. In ns-3, the value of delay, frame size, and the inter-frame gap
can be assigned to model a real network.
In the simulation code, different IP addresses have been assigned to each in-
terface representing a mesh of individual nodes. For experimental purposes, each
network node has one application node attached to it. This makes a total of 27
application nodes for Sprint and 34 application nodes for GÉANT2. Each appli-
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cation node generates traffic destined for the rest of the application nodes. Hence,
each application node is a source as well as a destination for the traffic flowing
from all the other nodes. The traffic flowing from the application nodes in the
network is constant bit rate (CBR) at 40 kb/s with a packet size of 1000 bytes.
The network protocol used for the simulator is UDP (user datagram protocol).
UDP allows network applications to send messages to another host without re-
quiring to setup a connection between the two hosts apriori. UDP is an unreliable
service because no handshaking and resource allocation is completed before the
traffic starts to flow in the network. This unreliability often causes packets to be
received out of order, duplicated or to go missing without notice.
For this thesis, the routes are statically configured using the Dijkstra’s shortest
path algorithm. During route computation nodes share information that is used
to approximate link state routing. However, in the event of a failure, the routes




This chapter aims to justify the simulator design with the help of several sim-
ulations and their results. Various challenge scenarios were designed and applied
onto the given networks to evaluate the simulator’s concept and functioning.
This chapter is organized as follows: First, some of the relevant performance
metrics are discussed. All the results are studied in terms of goodput and packet
delivery ratio. Second, the parameters used in this simulation are described. Next,
a variety of failure scenarios are tested and plotted. Finally, some comparisons
are made across topologies that give some initial insight into the benefits of the
challenge simulator.
5.1 Performance Metrics
To evaluate the proper functioning of the simulator design and to justify the
goals and objectives which were intended from this thesis, certain performance
metrics were studied. To study the resilience of networks, the most relevant
metrics for this thesis were goodput and packet delivery ratio, which reflect the
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performability of the network under challenge.
5.1.1 Goodput
The rate at which useful data is received at the destination is referred to as
the goodput. Goodput calculation leaves out packet headers and information lost
or corrupted in transit along with any duplicate transmissions or retransmissions.
Goodput can be thought of as throughput seen by the receiver.
5.1.2 Packet Delivery ratio
Packet delivery ratio refers to the ratio of the number of packets successfully
received at the destination to the total number of packets sent by the sender.
5.2 Simulation Parameters
One of the essential parts of justifying the simulator design includes its thor-
ough evaluation. To test the simulator, various parameters are chosen and the
performance measured accordingly.
The simulator has the capability to separate the core nodes of the network from
the application nodes. The number of core nodes and their respective positions
are obtained from the network description files whereas the application nodes and
their respective locations can be variable. For evaluation purposes, one application
node is attached to each core node and an arbitrary position is assigned to it.
Link bandwidth or data rate that refers to the total link capacity is chosen to
be 10 Mb/s both for the core and the application nodes to avoid any bottlenecks.
A delay of 2 ms is set for the links which depicts how quickly the packet delivery
will take place.
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To assign IP addresses to the nodes two IP pools are created, one for the
core nodes and the other for the application nodes. As the simulator generates
the topologies, it extracts one IP address from the core pool and one from the
application pool and assigns them to the respective nodes. The network portion of
the IP addresses are also arbitrarily chosen: 10.1.0/24 for the core and 192.1.0/24
for the application nodes.
The networks are sufficiently overprovisioned so that traffic is not dropped
when there are no challenges. UDP (User Datagram Protocol) packets of size
1000 bytes are sent at a rate of 40 kb/s and the results observed.





where n corresponds to the total number of nodes present in the network, f
corresponds to the number of flows per node, t corresponds to the rate at which
the data is sent measured in bits per second, and B corresponds to number of
bytes sent per packet.
The simulation runs all start at 0.0001 seconds and stop at 15.0001 seconds
with two seconds given at the end to shut down all the processes before the simula-
tor stops completely. The challenge is applied based on the challenge specification
file, which for these simulations is from 5.0000 seconds to 10.0001 seconds.
At first the simulator is tested without any challenge applied to it. After
receiving the desired results, the simulator is tested against the challenge scenarios.
For each scenario several iteration are carried out to average the results. The
random cases are averaged over five runs to get a nominal value.
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5.3 Failure Scenarios
Fiber optic cable cuts and node failures can have a significant impact on net-
work operation hence their study is essential. Both natural failures and operator
accidents are inevitable and can be treated as random effects. Hence, we studied
the network behavior under various random link and random node outages.
5.3.1 Link Failures
In this section, we examine the impact of link failures on performability. For
the GÉANT2 actual topology with 34 nodes and the Sprint actual topology with
27 nodes, the results were as expected. Equal number of random links were shut
down for each of the networks with results averaged over five sets of failures.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the results for the GÉANT2 actual topology with 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 10, 20 links put down. The graphs clearly show more degradation of the
throughput as the number of links down increases. Similarly, the packet delivery
ratio decreases with increasing number of links down.
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 show the results for Sprint actual topology under random
link outages. The plots appear to show less degradation as compared to the
GÉANT2 actual topology even for 20 links shut down. This is because GÉANT2
has fewer redundant paths than the Sprint topology, however traffic has not been
normalised to permit direct comparison between these two topologies. Similarly,
the packet delivery ratio decreases with increasing number of links down, but not
as much as for the GÉANT2 topology.
Similar experiments were performed on the Sprint synthetic resilient and frag-
ile topologies to further justify the simulator’s functionality. The Sprint synthetic
resilient topology showed results similar to Sprint actual topology, while the Sprint
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Figure 5.1. Random Link Failures of GÉANT2 Actual Topology
Figure 5.2. Random Link Failures of GÉANT2 Actual Topology
synthetic fragile topology did show significant degradation depicting network seg-
regation.
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Figure 5.3. Random Link Failures of Sprint Actual Topology
Figure 5.4. Random Link Failures of Sprint Actual Topology
5.3.2 Node Failures
In this section we examine the effects on performability of node failures. For
the GÉANT2 and Sprint actual topologies, the results were also as expected. An
equal number of random nodes were shut down for each network. Figures 5.9
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Figure 5.5. Random Link Failures of Sprint Resilient Topology
Figure 5.6. Random Link Failures of Sprint Reslilient Topology
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Figure 5.7. Random Link Failures of Sprint Fragile Topology
Figure 5.8. Random Link Failures of Sprint Fragile Topology
42
Figure 5.9. Random Node Failures of GÉANT2 Actual Topology
and 5.10 show the results for the GÉANT2 actual topology under random node
outages with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20 nodes put down. The graphs clearly show
more degradation of throughput with more nodes down. Similarly, the packet
delivery ratio decreases with increasing number of nodes down. The effect of node
shutdown is more severe as compared to the effect of link cuts because each node
failure is equivalent to all of its connected link failing.
Figure 5.9 shows goodput for the GÉANT2 network with respect to node
failure. The goodput decreases with the number of nodes down. Similarly the
packet delivery ratio, shown in Figure 5.10, shows the expected decrease when
nodes are randomly shut down.
Similar results are obtained for the Sprint network; Figure 5.11 shows goodput
and Figure 5.10 shows the corresponding packet delivery ratios. With 20 random
nodes shut down, the goodput for the Sprint network is worse than the GÉANT2
network because a greater proportion of the network has failed.
The same number of random nodes were shut down for the Sprint synthetic
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Figure 5.10. Random Node Failures of GÉANT2 Actual Topology
Figure 5.11. Random Node Failures of Sprint Actual Topology
resilient and fragile topologies. Their corresponding results were analysed against
those for the Sprint actual topology. Figure 5.13 shows improved response over
Figure 5.11 because of the more resilient topology. The same improvement is
visible in the packet delivery ratio curves in Figure 5.14. On the other hand, con-
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Figure 5.12. Random Node Failures of Sprint Actual Topology
siderable degradation is observed for the Sprint synthetic fragile topology goodput
and packet delivery ratio as compared to the Sprint actual topology, as shown in
Figures 5.15 and 5.16.
Figure 5.13. Random Node Failures of Sprint Resilient Topology
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Figure 5.14. Random Node Failures of Sprint Resilient Topology
Figure 5.15. Random Node Failures of Sprint Fragile Topology
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Figure 5.16. Random Node Failures of Sprint Fragile Topology
5.4 Resilience to Natural Disasters
Natural Disasters pose a significant challenge to network operation due to the
large number of nodes and links that may be disrupted. Using the simulator
designed for this thesis, a geographical study of a specific network is made possi-
ble. Now we can predict the behavior of a network under any large scale natural
disaster. For the geographical scenario, the Sprint actual topology was studied
and three areas were targetted as shown in Figure 5.17. It can be clearly seen
in Figure 5.18 that the throughput under the challenge which covers the Florida
region is better than the throughput under the West and the Northeast challenge.
The West and the Northeast region both contain a major portion of the Sprint’s
network and hence they are more affected as compared to Florida. The Northeast
challenge shows worse response because the number of node outages in the North-
east region are greater than the number of node outages in the West or Florida.
Similar results are seen for the packet delivery ratio in Figure 5.19.
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Figure 5.17. Sprint Geographical Attacks
5.5 Attack Scenarios
Attacking the fiber optic cables which constitute the links between the nodes
or attacking the nodes themselves to switch them off are an attractive means to
jeopardise the network for the adversaries, who can target only the key nodes or
links to do the most damage to the network.
5.5.1 Link Attack
To compare the results for random link failures against the consequences of
intelligent attacks against the network infrastructure, particular links were at-
tacked and hence taken down. Figure 5.20 shows the links which were cut for the
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Figure 5.18. Geographical Shutdown Sprint Actual Topology
Figure 5.19. Geographical Shutdown Sprint Actual Topology
GÉANT2 network to observe network performability.
The GÉANT2 results show degraded response because the links that were
removed partitioned the network. Figure 5.21 shows the goodput decrease and
Figure 5.22 shows the corresponding packet delivery ratio decrease.
Figure 5.23 shows the links which were cut for the Sprint actual topology to
observe the network behavior. In spite of attacking the five links shown in Fig-
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Figure 5.20. Link Attack Against GÉANT2 Actual Topology
ure 5.23, the throughput shown in Figure 5.24 and the packet delivery ratio shown
in Figure 5.25 did not show considerable degradation because of the redundant
paths present to permit rerouting the packets flowing in the network.
5.5.2 Node Attack
Figures 5.26 and 5.27 show the effects of attacks targetting nodes rather than
links. The effect of the attack is evident in Figures 5.28 and 5.29. It is quite
apparent that significant damage has been done while attacking only a few nodes.
Figures 5.30 and 5.31 depict attacks scenarios against the Sprint network
topology. Key nodes are targetted that would inflict the most damage.
Figure 5.32 shows the goodput results when these three and five key nodes
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Figure 5.21. Link Attack Against GÉANT2 Actual Topology
Figure 5.22. Link Attack Against GÉANT2 Actual Topology
are compromised. It is obvious that with three and five random nodes down,
the goodput did not decrease to such a level as it did for three or five selectively
attacked nodes. Similar results are seen for the packet delivery ratio under node
attack, as shown in Figure 5.33.
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Figure 5.23. Link Attack Against Sprint Actual Topology
Figure 5.24. Link Attack Against Sprint Actual Topology
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Figure 5.25. Link Attack Against Sprint Actual Topology
Figure 5.26. 3 Node Attack Against GÉANT2 Actual Topology
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Figure 5.27. 5 Node Attack Against GÉANT2 Actual Topology
Figure 5.28. Node Attack Against GÉANT2 Actual Topology
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Figure 5.29. Node Attack Against GÉANT2 Actual Topology
Figure 5.30. 3 Node Attack Against Sprint Actual Topology
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Figure 5.31. 5 Node Attack Against Sprint Actual Topology
Figure 5.32. Node Attack Against Sprint Actual Topology
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Figure 5.33. Node Attack Against Sprint Actual Topology
5.6 Attack and Failure Comparisons
After the individual scenarios were simulated and their results analysed, mul-
tiple scenarios are plotted against performance parameters to compare the per-
formability and thus the resilience of the different network topologies. For com-
parison purposes, the GÉANT2 actual, Sprint actual, Sprint resilient, and Sprint
fragile results were all plotted together. First we compare node failures, followed
by link failures. The time step chosen for all of the comparison plots was 6 seconds,
at which point the network was under the influence of a challenge. Figure 5.34
clearly shows a decrease in goodput with the increase of the number of random
nodes shut down. Both the Sprint actual topology and Sprint synthetic resilient
topology give approximately similar results, with the resilient topology showing a
bit better value of goodput. The Sprint synthetic fragile topology, on the other
hand, clearly shows degraded performance.
Figure 5.35 shows degradation with the Sprint synthetic resilient topology
giving the best performance and the Sprint synthetic fragile topology giving the
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Figure 5.34. Goodput vs. Random Node Down
Figure 5.35. PDR vs. Random Node Down
worst packet delivery ratio. The curve for the GÉANT2 actual topology shows
results very similar to the Sprint actual topology but cannot be directly compared
since traffic is not normalised.
Figure 5.36 shows the value for the goodput when three and five nodes are
attacked for both the Sprint actual and GÉANT2 actual topologies. GÉANT2
shows a steeper decline in performance due to its partitioning when more nodes
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Figure 5.36. Goodput vs. Node Attack
fail.
Figure 5.37. Goodput vs. Random Link Down
Figure 5.37 shows the impact of link failures for the GÉANT2 actual topology,
Sprint synthetic resilient topology, Sprint actual topology, and Sprint synthetic
fragile topology. As expected, the curves show slow degradation with an increasing
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number of links down. The packet delivery ratio curves show similar results, as
in Figure 5.38.
Figure 5.38. PDR vs. Random Link Down
Figure 5.39. Goodput vs. Link Attack
Figure 5.39 shows the goodput values when four links were attacked for the
GÉANT2 actual topology and five for the Sprint actual topology. These plots
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Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter concludes this thesis summarising the simulator’s strengths and
weaknesses in the light of experimental results obtained.
6.1 Conclusions
Ns-3 is a newly developed network simulator that was used to analyse the
resilience of network topologies to challenges in this thesis. The challenge module
developed is unique as it applies generic challenges to any network model. Network
specifications and challenge specifications are brought together by the simulator
to model the resilience of the network under the challenge.
In designing this challenge simulator, a new methodology has been introduced
for evaluating network resilience which is independent of network characteristics.
In other words, a challenge can be applied to a network independent of its char-
acteristics, and then its resilience can be evaluated.
By performing the tests on two different communication networks, Sprint and
GÉANT2, the above mentioned concept is proved. We have seen that whenever
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the network is either under some challenge including attack, the performance of
the network decreases, and the decrease has been shown to reflect the severity of
the challenge. Hence, this model can be used to evaluate resilience and compare
the performability of different topologies.
6.2 Contributions
This thesis provides a new tool that permits the separartion of challenge spec-
ification from the network model, so that resilience can be simulated without
modification of the network model for each challenge. Furthermore this thesis
demonstrates the utility of this technique by evaluating the resilience of several
network topologies under several challenges.
6.3 Future Work
This challenge simulator design has only considered wired networks. In the real
world, wireless networks are increasingly important. Wireless networks consist of
a set of untethered nodes that communicate with other nodes that lie in their
transmission range and may be mobile.
Wireless links are a critical point of attack. A popular challenge includes node
jammers that send signal with a very high power impacting the normal trans-
mission. Link attenuation can also lead to impairment and hence a disconnected
network. Incorporating node jammer and link attenuation challenges in the sim-
ulator design can further enhance its utility.
This simulator aims to evaluate the performability aspect of resilience of a
network, but does not help to improve it. As a future extension of this simulator,
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another module can be designed which takes the results of this simulator for a
given network and provides input to the topology generator to generate more
resilient topologies.
This thesis design has only focused on static challenges. Static challenges begin
at some time t0 over an area or random set of nodes and end at some other time
t1. On the other hand, a dynamic challenge allows the evolution of the challenge
over time and network topology. This simulator can be extended to permit the
specification of a trajectory of the attack scenario polygon.
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